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attitudes towards optional tours. They find that when the channel 
is coordinated and the ratio of optional tours is sufficiently large, the 
local operator may reduce commissions. To curb the impacts of 
lowering commissions, the authors introduce a tax mechanism aimed 
at optional tours. Numeral examples are provided to illustrate the 
pricing impacts of optional tours. 
Keywords: tourism supply chain management; optional tours; over-
low commission; tax mechanism 
In today's tourism industry package tours can be generally categorized as either 
predesigned or optional tours. Broadly speaking, the content of optional tours 
comprises entertainment activities, shopping and sightseeing, and so on. At the 
initial stage of development, optional tours are added as extensions to the 
predesigned content of package tours with tourists participating in these 
additional activities if (free) time permits (Enoch, 1996). For the tourist 
optional tours add flexibility to classic packaged tours and offer them 
opportunities to choose what they prefer. For tour operators optional tours 
provide additional revenue. Since optional tours benefit both customers and 
suppliers, they have become one of the key components of package tours in 
recent years. 
Optional tours often play a role as distinguishing features in attracting 
tourists who prefer more flexibility in choosing tour products. In addition, the 
marginal profit of optional tours is often greater than that of predesigned tours. 
As a result, tour operators are motivated to increase their offerings of optional 
tours. Although optional tours play a significant role in contemporary tourism 
operations, there are limited academic studies on their effective use. To fill this 
gap, we provide here a simple but insightful tourism supply chain model with 
both predesigned and optional tours. Specifically, we discuss the role of optional 
tours under a typical tourism supply chain, which consists of a tour operator 
and a local in-market operator. Together they provide the tourists with a 
package tour composed of a predesigned tour and optional tours. The tour 
operator in the source market determines the price of the predesigned portion 
then advertises/sells the product to tourists. The local operator in the destination is 
responsible for providing tour services and decides the commission price. Our 
paper makes three main contributions, summarized below. 
(a) Through an equilibrium analysis we show how optional tours affect system 
demand and profit. In particular, we show that an increase in optional tours 
can both benefit and hurt each player depending on tourist preferences. 
(b) Quantity discount contracts are introduced into the tourism supply chain 
to achieve coordination. We identify the conditions under which the 
commission price that the local operator earns for providing predesigned 
tour service is not greater than the corresponding costs. In other words, 
the local operator makes zero or minus profit by providing predesigned tour 
service in that case. In such an extreme case, the local operator makes 
positive profits only from optional tours, which completely reveals the 
meaningful role of optional tours. In this paper, that case is referred as the 
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over-low commission (OLC) case. A counterpart of OLC in practice is zero 
or minus commission (Zhang et at, 2009b), which often occurs in the 
Chinese tourism supply chain. Our analysis shows that coordination might 
be a driver of OLC and a large proportion of optional tours are fundamental 
conditions of OLC. 
(c) In practice, zero or minus commission is often accompanied by cheating 
and threatening, which leads to serious tourist dissatisfaction and harms 
the development of the Chinese tourism industry (Zhang et at, 2009a). 
Hence, we present a further discussion on a tax aimed at optional tours 
to curb OLC. The model analysis verifies that OLC can be curbed by 
adjusting the tax rate. Through numerical examples we show that local 
government can control zero or minus commission by adjusting the tax 
rate. 
In the following section we highlight the relevant literature. Then we provide 
a description of the model in the subsequent section. The equilibrium analysis 
of the channel is presented after the model description. We then provide a 
discussion on tax rate impacts on coordination, followed by numerical examples 
and conclusions. 
Literature revtew 
First, we review some empirical papers that emphasize the critical role of 
optional tours. Enoch ( 1996) presents a comparison study on contents of 
package tours illustrating how optional tours are viewed as an extension to the 
predesigned content of package tours. Wang et at (2000) identify optional tours 
as one of the three main critical service features in package tours. They show 
that fees for optional tours are one of the main reasons for customer 
dissatisfaction. In addition, non-participation by guides in optional tours 
contributes towards dissatisfaction. For further studies concerning tour guides 
see Mak et at (20 11) and Wang et at (20 1 0). 
Since our research is closely related to competitive pricing in the tourism 
supply chain, we discuss a few related papers. Lee and Jang (2013) utilize a 
spatial econometric model to study asymmetric price competition among hotels 
differentiated in terms of quality. Their research confirms that those lower-
quality hotels are forced to discount deeper in the low season. Song et at (2009) 
consider a pricing game between a theme park and a tour operator. In their 
paper, a quantity discount contract is used to coordinate the channel and the 
theme park shares a large part of the coordinated profit owing to its dominant 
role in the coordination. Dong et at (2012) study pricing competition among 
three players: a tour operator; a mature destination; and an underdeveloped 
destination. They focus on the underdeveloped destination's pricing decisions 
under different modes of cooperation. A comparative analysis of coordination 
modes provides insight into the development of the underdeveloped destination. 
In addition to price competition within traditional business contexts, more 
recent efforts have focused on Internet or e-commerce enabled price 
competition. For example, Ling et at (2011), Ling et at (2012) and Guo et at 
(2013) illustrate price competition between a hotel and a third-party website. 
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In particular, Guo et al (2013) consider price competition between multiple 
hotels and a single third-party website that distributes the hotels' rooms online. 
They show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solutions. Other 
papers illustrate the impacts of both price and quantity competition within a 
tourism context; see Yang et al (2009), Huang et al (2010a), Huang et al 
(2010b), Dong et al (2011), Huang et al (2012) and Guo and He (2012). 
Finally we summarize relevant literature on zero or negative commissions. 
Zhang et al (2009b) define zero or minus commissions as a pricing scheme 
between local operators and tour operators, in which local operators charge zero 
or minus commission. Consequently, the price of the tour products is extremely 
low and mass tourists are attracted to purchase. However, when tourists arrive 
in the destinations, they are forced to consume excessive optional tours by local 
operators, which lead to considerable tourist dissatisfaction. Zhang et al (2009b) 
identify nine factors that contribute to zero commission and their resulting 
tourist dissatisfaction. Besides these empirical studies, Zhang et al (2009a) study 
the mechanism of zero or minus commission based on a game theoretic 
approach. In their paper, a Nash equilibrium model is applied to explain the 
game between two local operators. Their research indicates that zero or minus 
commission has a tremendous negative impact on all of the stakeholders. As 
an example of the attention paid to zero commission, the Chinese government 
has defined zero or minus commission as occurring when a tour operator's cost 
of providing the tour service is no less than the corresponding commission price 
(see http://www.hainan.gov.cn/data/hnzb/2006/06/586/). This is consistent with 
our definition of OLC. 
The problem 
We consider a tourism supply chain that comprises a tour operator selling 
package tour products in the source market and a local operator supplying tour 
services in the destination. The package tour product is composed of a single 
predesigned tour and a single optional tour. The tour operator determines the 
price, p, for the predesigned part of the package tours and charges no fee for 
the optional part, the operational cost of the tour operator is c,. The local 
operator determines commission price w charged to the tour operator for the 
predesigned tour and supplies the tourists with the optional tours at price ap, 
where a(>O) is a constant for a certain type of package tour and stands for the 
ratio of the optional tours to the predesigned tours. In particular, the constant 
a is predetermined by the local operator according to the expected revenue of 
the predesigned tours and the optional tours before the package tours are sold. 
Moreover, the local operator's cost of predesigned tour services is c1 and that 
of optional tour services is c10• The event sequence of the decision-making process 
in the tourism supply chain is: (a) The local operator decides the predesigned 
tour and optional tour, as well as the ratio of optional tours to predesigned 
tours, a. (b) The local operator determines the commission price w for the 
predesigned tour. (c) Then the tour operator decides the price p for the predesigned 
tour and sells the packaged tours. (d) The local operator supplies the predesigned 
tour for tourists and provides the optional tour at price ap for the tourists who 
participate in optional tours. 
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Tourists make purchase decisions according to the expected utility of trav-
elling, which is defined as follows: 
U = v + a(} - p - yt, (1) 
where v is the basic utility (homogeneous for every tourist) that a tourist 
receives from consuming the package tour products; and a(} represents the 
utility of consuming optional tours, where (} represents the attitude of the 
tourists to the optional tour (preference, aversion and insensitivity). A tourist 
with 8>0 indicates positive utility towards optional tours, similarly, 8<0 
indicates an aversion and 8= 0 an indifference towards optional tours. Addition-
ally, utility is decreased as a result of the purchasing price, p, and other expenses 
(such as time or energy), t, tourists experience as a result of participation. For 
simplicity we assume that, t>O is identical for all tourists. Moreover, we 
introduce r to represent the diverse attitudes of the tourists to this expense. 
Where r is assumed to follow a uniform distribution with density function .f<x) 
and XE {O,p}. 
The tourists purchase the package tours if and only if their expected utilities 
are non-negative (U~O). Then the demand for package tours can be obtained 
as follows: 
q z zp (v - 1', + (}aJ, - fc<; P+fJall:f<x)dx 
p 
(2) 
where Z IS the size of the tourism market. 
Let A Zl(pt), then Equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
q = A(v - p + (}a). (3) 
Further, we assume that there is A.(O~A-~1) proportion of total tourists 
attracted to consuming the optional tours. Thus, the demand of optional tours 
is A,q. We study each player's equilibrium pricing decisions in a non-cooperative 
and full information setting. 
Analysis 
In this section, we derive each player's equilibrium pricing decision and profit. 
Then, analysis of equilibrium profits reveals how optional tours affect each 
player's decision making. In particular, we study each player's equilibrium profit 
with regard to optional tours. The results provide insight into how to adjust 
optional tour composition according to tourists' attitudes towards optional tours 
(see Propositions 1 and 2). To study OLC we present coordination analysis in 
the next subsection. Specifically, quantity discount contracts are introduced to 
coordinate the channel (see Proposition 3). Further discussion on the contracts 
not only identifies the conditions under which the OLC happens (see 
Proposition 4), but also shows that optional tours are fundamental conditions 
of OLC (see Corollary 1 ). 
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Equilibrium analysis 
Let TC10 be the tour operator's profit and n1" be the local operator's profit. Then 
we have: 
(4) 
TC10 A(v - p + 8a)(p - w - c). (5) 
Define ce = c1 + c1 + A.c1" as the average cost of serving a tourist across the tourism 
supply chain. A sufficient condition to guarantee non-negative equilibrium 
demand (q*) is that v>ce (this condition holds in all the subsequent sections). 
Furthermore, when 8<0, a should satisfy 0<a<ix1 to guarantee that q*>O. Here: 
e + AV + ~ ( e - AV )2 + 4 eA.ce 
28)., 
(6) 
By using backwards induction, we, first, derive the equilibrium price for the 
predesigned tour of package tours charged by the tour operator: 
p* v + ae + cl + w (7) 
2 
By substituting Equation (7) into TC10 , we can get n1o(w). Since iJn1o(w)/{}u/ 
- A(2+aA)I2<0, n10(w) is concave in w. Then the first order condition yields the 
local operator's equilibrium commission price (w*) for the predesigned tour: 
* w 
v + ae + ce 
2 + aA 
(8) 
From Equation (8) we can see that the equilibrium commission price (w*) 
is increasing in the proportion of optional tours (a) when 8>A(ce +v)/2; otherwise, 
the equilibrium price is decreasing with a. In other words, only when the 
tourists in the market have sufficient optional-tour-preference, the local tour 
operator can increase the commission price by increasing the proportion of 
optional tours. According to Equations (3) and (8) equilibrium demand (q*) is: 
q* 
(a8 + v)(l + aA,) - c A e 
2(2 + aA-) (9) 
From Equation (9) we can see that the equilibrium demand is decreasing with 
the average cost ce and increasing with the proportion of optional tours a when 
8>0. Therefore, tourists have positive optional tour preference, as an increase 
in a attracts tourists, increasing demand for package tours. 
Finally, the tour operator's and the local operator's equilibrium profits can 
be obtained as follows: 
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((a8 + v)(l + aA.) - cY 
A--------------------
4(2 + aA.? 
(10) 
((a8 + v)(l + aA.) - c )2 A e 
4(2 + aA.) 
(11) 
From Equations (10) and (11) we analyse the relationship between the 
proportion of the optional tours and each player's equilibrium profit. 
Proposition 1. If tourists have positive optional tour preference (l:hO), both 
the local operator's equilibrium profit (n;,) and the tour operator's equilibrium 
profit (n;) increase with the proportion (a). (Please refer to the Appendix for 
all proofs.) 
Proposition 2. If tourists are averse to optional tours ((J<O), with 
a2 = - (98 + AV + ~ (98 + Av)2 - 12~48 + A(cf + 3v)))/(68A), 
and 
a3 = - (28 + ~ ~28 - A(ce + v)))/(8A.), 
the following properties hold. 
(a) If 8 ~- A(ce + 3v)/4, then the local operator's equilibrium profit (n;,) decreases 
with the proportion (a) in (O,a1). 
(b) If- A(ce+3v)/4 < 8 < 0 and v > max{t:e,(8+2'J=a)/A.}, then the local 
operator's equilibrium profit (n;,) increases with the proportion in (O,a2} and 
then decreases in [a2,a1). 
(c) If 8 ~- A(ce +v)/2, then the tour operator's equilibrium profit (n;,) decreases 
with the proportion in (O,a1). 
(d) If- A(L~+v)/2 < 8 < 0 and v > max{ce,(8+~)/A}, then the tour operator's 
~qui~ib~ium profit (n;,) increases with the proportion in (O,a) and decreases 
m [a1,a1). 
Proposition 1 indicates that both the local operator and the tour operator are 
motivated to increase the mix of optional tours if tourists in the source market 
have positive optional tour preference. However, if tourists are optional tour 
averse (Proposition 2), the mix of optional tours depends on the extent of 
tourists' aversion. Specifically, both the local operator and the tour operator 
are likely to decrease optional tours if tourists are sufficiently averse 
(8 ~ - A(ce + 3v)/4). If tourists are only slightly averse to optional tours 
(- A(ce +v)/2 < 8 < 0), there is interval ([O,min{a2,a3}}) in which the increase 
in optional tours Pareto benefits the two players. In other words, both of players 
are motivated to increase the proportion if the proportion lies in the interval. 
However, in [min{a2,a3}, max{a2,a3}}, increase in the proportion benefits one 
player while simultaneously hurting the other. As a result, the ratio of optional 
tours is likely to be determined by the player who has stronger bargaining 
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power. In the rest of the interval, an increase in proportion decreases both 
players' profits. Based on the above analysis, we conclude the following. 
Insight 1. In the full equilibrium setting, how to adjust the ratio of optional 
tours (a) depends on tourists' attitude in optional tours (8). Specifically: 
(a) if tourists have optional tour preference (Proposition 1 ), then both the local 
operator and the tour operator intend to increase the mix of optional tours; 
(b) if tourists are sufficiently averse to optional tours (property (a) in 
Proposition 2), an increase in the proportion hurts the two players' profit; 
and 
(c) if tourists are only slightly averse to optional tours (property (d) in 
Proposition 2), there exists an interval in which increases in optional tour 
composition benefit both the tour operator and local operator. 
Coordination analysis 
Here we consider a coordination mechanism for the tourism supply chain. From 
Equations (4) and (5), we can obtain the total profit for the supply chain: 
(12) 
Since J2TI(p)liJji - 2(1 + aA.) <0, TI(p) is concave in p. The first-order 
condition yields the chain's optimal retail price of the predesigned tour of the 
package (p"): 
ae + v c 
e (13) + 
2 2(1 + aA.) 
In the coordinated scenario, the optimal price is increasing in the proportion 
of optional tours when B>A.c/(1 +aA)2; otherwise, the optimal price is decreasing 
in the proportion of optional tours. Meanwhile, the chain's optimal demand (qo) 
IS: 
qo = A ( 
ae + v 
2 
and the optimal profit (TI") Is: 
A((ae + v)(l + aA.) - c)2 
4(1 + aA.) 
(14) 
(15) 
Several empirical studies (for example, Zhang and Murphy, 2009; Schiff and 
Becken, 2011) show that discount policies are widely adopted in tourism 
industry. Thus, we employ quantity discount contracts to achieve channel 
coordination. 
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Proposition 3. The tourism supply chain can be coordinated under the 
following quantity discount contracts: 
¢(1 + aA))(v + Oa q/A), (16) 
where (1 + aA-)1(2 + aA)2 s ¢ s 1 /(2 + aA). 
Moreover, Jr1" = (1 ¢)no, Jr," ¢n°. 
Through Equation ( 16), it is easy to see that the commission price decreases 
with the channel's optimal demand under the discount quantity contracts. To 
achieve channel coordination, the tourism supply chain is motivated to decrease 
the commission price, which leads to the decrease in the price of package tours 
and attracts more tourists. However, when tourists arrive in the destinations, 
local operators will take various actions to force tourist to consume excessive 
optional tours (Zhang et al, 2009a). According to the definition of OLC, OLC 
appears if wsc1• By substituting l into Equation (16), we can obtain (w-{) 
as: 
lfxe 
2 
¢(1 + aA)(aO+v) 
2 
aO+v ce 
+--+ -c 
2 2(1 +aA) ' 
Equation (17) shows under what condition OLC occurs. 
Proposition 4. If the follow condition holds: 
(1 +aA)(a0+v-2(c,+t)) + ce 
(1 +aA)(aO+v) - cf 
(17) 
(18) 
then the local operator's commission price (w) is no greater than the cost of 
providing tour service (c,) under quantity discount contract, that is, OLC occurs. 
(The proof is straightforward and omitted.) 
Proposition 4 indicates that quantity discount contracts can provide condi-
tions for the creation of OLC. Thus, we can conclude that short-term coordination 
might be a driver~( OLC. Proposition 4 presents the conditions of OLC in terms 
of ¢. The following corollary shows that the ratio of optional tours is a 
fundamental condition of OLC. 
Corollary 1. 
If ae + v + 2cf 
OLC does not appear. 
By defining X(a) as: 
X(a) = ae + v 
1+aA' 
(19) 
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then X( a) has the following properties: 
(a) if () ;? A(2c1 + 2c, + c), then X(a) increases with a; 
(b) if 2A(c, + c) < () < A(2c, + 2c, + c), then z(a) first decreases and then 
increases with a; 
(c) if () ::;; 2A(c1 + c,), then X(a) decreases with a. 
Since X(O) > 0, X(a) is greater than zero for a > 0 in case (a). In case (b), we 
denote that the global minimum z(a) by a. If a < 0 or X(a) > 0, X(a) is also 
greater than zero for a > 0. If a > 0 and X(a) < 0, then there is a range of 
a in which X(a) < 0. In case (c), z(a) has only one zero point and OLC cannot 
appear when a is less than the zero. The above analysis reveals that a large 
proportion of optional tours are the fundamental conditions of OLC. 
As a conclusion of coordination analysis, we provide the following insight. 
Insight 2. OLC is economically effective for the channel from the perspective 
of coordination. To some content, coordination might be a driver of OLC. More 
importantly, a large proportion of optional tours are fundamental conditions of 
OLC. 
Tax effects 
A few empirical studies point out that zero or minus commission does more 
harm than good to the tourism industry (Zhang et a/, 2009a, 2009b). First, 
zero or minus commission makes tourists suffer considerable psychological and 
financial costs. Second, mass tourist arrivals caused by zero or minus commis-
sion result in excessive deterioration in environmental quality in destinations. 
Considering the harmful effects of zero or minus commission, we present a 
further discussion on how to curb OLC. 
Since zero or minus commission has led to serious tourist dissatisfaction, 
tourists begin to exhibit some aversion to optional tours. Hence, we study the 
tourism supply chain with () < 0 here. Motivated by taxation of tourism 
activities (Palmer and Riera, 2003; Gago et a/, 2009), a tax aimed at optional 
tours is introduced into the tourism supply chain. In applying the tax we intend 
to achieve two effects: adjusting tourist arrivals and curbing OLC. These two 
effects will be verified in the subsequent analysis. 
Under taxation, the local operator needs to pay tax rap for sale of the optional 
tours where r is the tax rate. The local operator's and tour operator's tax adjusted 
profits are as follows: 
(20) 
n,o A(v - p + Ba)(p - w - c). (21) 
The condition to guarantee that the equilibrium demand (q**) is greater than 
zero is 0 < a < al' where: 
() + Av(l - r) + ~ 48A.(l - r)(ce - v) + (() + A(l - r)v)2 
28A.(l - r) 
(22) 
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The above model can be solved by backwards induction producing an 
equilibrium commission price (w**) as: 
** w 
ce + a() + v 
2 + aA.(l - r) 
(23) 
From Equation (23) we see that the commission price is increasing with the 
ratio of optional tours when () > ).,(1 - r)(ce + v)/2. Comparing with the case 
without tax (() > A(c" + v)/2), the local tour operator is more likely to increase 
the commission price by increasing the ratio of optional tours. The demand 
function (q**) is: 
(a() + v)(aA(1 - r) + 1) - ce 
q** = A ------------
2(2 + aA.(l - r)) 
(24) 
Since aq**/()r < 0, the equilibrium demand decreases with tax rate. Thus, the 
policymaker can control the arrivals of tourists by adjusting the tax rate in the 
equilibrium scenario. The two players' equilibrium profits are: 
((a() + v)(aA(1 - r) + 1) - c )2 
n;,~ = A 4(2 + aA.(l - r)) e ' (25) 
** ((a() + v)(aA(1 - r) + 1) - c )2 
n," = A e • 
4(2 + aA.(l - r)f 
(26) 
We discuss the relationship between the ratio of optional tours and two 
players' equilibrium profits after tax. Then the following proposition is 
concluded. 
Proposition 5. If tourists m the source market are optional tour aversiOn 
(() < 0), let 
a2 = - (98+Av(1-r) +-v (98-Av(l-r))Z-12~48+A(l-r)c))/(68A(1-r)) 
and 
a3 = - (28+~ ~28-).,(1-r)(ce+v)))/(8).,(1-r)), 
then the following properties hold. 
(a) If () ~ - A(ce + 3v)(l-r)/4, then the local operator's equilibrium profit after 
tax (n;) decreases with the proportion (a) in (O,a1). 
(b) If- A(ce+3v)(l-r)l4<8<0 and v>max{ce,(8+2~-A8ce(l-r))/((1-r)A)}, then the 
local operator's equilibrium profit after tax (n;,) increases with the proportion 
in (O,a2) and decreases in [a2,aJ 
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(c) If 8 $;- A-(1-r)(ce+v)/2, then the tour operator's equilibrium profit after tax 
(n;) decreases with the proportion in (O,a1). 
(d) If - A(1-r)(ce+v)l2<8<0 and v>max{ce,(8+2~r----=-A-8c-e(-1--r--))/((l-r)A)} then the 
tour operator's equilibrium profit after tax (n;) increases with the proportion 
in (O,a3) and decreases in {a3,a1). (The proof of Proposition 5 is similar 
to that of Proposition 2, and therefore omitted.) 
From Equation (21) we derive the channel's profit after tax: 
(27) 
Then the channel's optimal product price is: 
a8 + v ce 
+ -------
2 2(1 + aA.(l - r))' (28) 
which is increasing with the ratio of optional tours when 8 > A.ce(l - r)l 
(1 + aA(1 - r))2; otherwise, io is decreasing with a. Comparing with the case 
without tax (8 > A.cj(l + aA)2), we see that the optimal product price is more 
likely to increase with the ratio of optional tours. The optimal demand is: 
( 
a8 + v ce J 
qoo = A 2 - 2(1 + aA(1 - r)) . (29) 
Since aqool& < 0, tourist arrivals can also be adjusted by changing the tax 
rate in the coordination scenario. The optimal profit ts: 
n
oo = «a8 + v)O + aA.O - r)) - cY A . 
4(1 + aA.(l - r)) 
(30) 
Similarly, we also employ quantity discount contracts to achieve channel 
coordination under the tax mechanism. 
Proposition 6. If the following condition holds: 
1 + aA.(l - r) 1 
------ $; ¢ $; -----
(2 + aA.(l - r))2 2 + aA.(l - r) 
(31) 
and then the tourism supply chain can be coordinated under quantity discount 
contracts: 
w(q) = - c, + cf>ce + (1 - ¢(1 + aA(1 - r)))(v + 8a - q/A). (32) 
And n," = ¢noo' n1" = (1 - ¢)n°0 • (The proof is straightforward, thus omitted.) 
Observing Equations ( 16) and (32), we see that for identical increase in 
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optimal demand l!!..q, the decrease in commission price without tax is 
l!!..qf/i..1 + aA.)IA and the decrease with tax is l!!..q¢(1 + aA(1 - r))/A. Obviously, 
tax can reduce the effect of the discount on commission price. Intuitively, if 
the tax rate is sufficiently large then w ~ c1 might be curbed. Corollary 2 reveals 
the condition. 
Corollary 2. When the tax rate meets the following condition: 
r < r < min{1,r}, 
and then OLC can be curbed. Here: 
r 1 - (a8+2N1"+v-4(c,+c1)+"8ce(c,+t)+(a8+2N1"+v)2)!(4aA(c,+c)) 
1 - (a8+ 2N1" +v-4(c,+c)-'\~k(c,+c)+(a8+ 2A.c1"+v)2)1(4aA(c,+c)). (33) 
So far, the effects of the tax, adjusting tourist arrivals and curbing OLC, have 
been both verified in the previous analysis. In addition, comparing Proposition 
5 with Proposition 2, we can find that the form of each player's profit function 
is not distorted by the tax, but the positions of extreme points change with 
tax rate. Thus, policymakers can affect the two players' decision making by 
changing the tax rate in the equilibrium scenario. In summary we provide the 
following insight. 
Insight 3. Tourist arrivals can be adjusted and OLC can be curbed by setting 
proper tax rate. Furthermore, each player's equilibrium profit function is not 
distorted by tax, but the positions of extreme points change with the tax rate. 
Numerical examples 
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to illustrate the 
corresponding conclusions derived in the previous sections. The basic parameters 
in these examples are: 
2.5, v 15, A- 0.6. 
Equilibrium profits without tax 
First, we present instances for illustrating the conclusions in equilibrium profits 
without tax. In the first instance with 8 = 5 (Proposition 1), both the local 
operator's equilibrium profit (n;,) and the tour operator's equilibrium profit (n;,) 
increase with the ratio of optional tours (a) due to 8 = 5. The two players' 
equilibrium profit functions are visualized in Figure 1. Obviously, both (n;) and 
(n;) increase with a. 
In the second instance with 8 = -8 (Figure 2), due to 8 < - A(ce + 3v)/4 
(property (a) and (c) in Proposition 2), tourists in the source market are 
sufficiently averse to optional tours. Thus, both the local operator's and the tour 
operator's equilibrium profits (1r;0 ,1r;,) decrease with the proportion in (0, 1.438). 
952 TOURISM ECONOMICS 
150 
100 
50 
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
Figure 1. Local operator's and tour operator's equilibrium profits with 8 = 5. 
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Figure 2. Local operator's and tour operator's equilibrium profits with 8 = -8. 
In the third case with 8 = -3 (Figure 3), tourists in the source market are 
only slightly averse to optional tours. According to property (b) in Proposition 
2, the local operator's equilibrium profit (1r~) increases with the proportion in 
(0, 1.268} and then decreases in [1.268, 4.405}. Correspondingly, the tour 
operator's equilibrium profit (n:) increases with the proportion in (0, 0.850} 
and then decreases in [0.850, 4.405}. If the original proportion in the contract 
~------
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Figure 3. Local operator's and tour operator's equilibrium profits with () = -3. 
lies in interval A ((0, 0.850}), both players are Pareto benefited by increasing 
the proportion. If the original proportion lies in interval B ((0.850, 1.268}), 
an increase in proportion benefits the local operator and hurts the tour operator. 
As a result, whether to change the proportion might depend on each player's 
bargaining power. Specifically, when the local operator has more bargaining 
power, the proportion is likely to increase; otherwise, the proportion is likely 
not to change or to decrease. In interval C ({1.268, 4.405}), both players' profits 
decrease with the proportion. 
Optional tours in OLC 
We now analyse the role of optional tours in OLC numerically. Figure 4 
visualizes X(a) under different cases in which tourists' attitudes in optional tours 
(()) change (Corollary 1). In the case with (() = 7) (2A(c1+c)<8<2A(c1+c)+Ac), 
X(a) first decreases in {0, 1.625} and then increases with the proportion 
(a= 1.625). Since X(a) > 0, OLC does not occur in this case either. However, in 
the above two cases, tourists in the source market have a high level of preference 
for optional tours, which is not likely to appear in practice. In particular, owing 
to the negative effects of OLC, tourists are more likely to have low-level 
preference or aversion to optional tours (() ::;; 2A(c1+c)). The () = 1 and () = -1 
curves correspond to a low-level preference case and aversion case, respectively. 
Both decrease with the proportion and if the proportion exceeds the zero points 
(1.615, 0) and (2.165, 0), OLC appears (Equation (18) holds). Conversely, if 
the proportion is relatively small (for example, a is less than 1.615 in the case 
with () = -1), OLC does not occur. The zero point of the () = -8 curve is 
relatively small (a = 0.876); however, this is an extreme case in which tourists 
are sufficiently averse to optional tours. Generally, this case is not common in 
practice. Based on this numerical instance, we conclude that OLC is not likely 
to occur if the ratio of optional tours is relatively small in practice. In other 
words, a large proportion of optional tours are fundamental conditions of OLC. 
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Tax effects 
Finally, we provide an instance with 8 = -1 for illustrating tax effects on 
curbing OLC. As mentioned in Corollary 2, the tax rate r should meet r < r 
< min{l,r} to curb OLC. In Figure 5, rand rare visualized by the dashed and 
dot-dashed curves, respectively. The points in the shadowed area between r = 
1 and r correspond to the feasible tax rates. Obviously, r concavely increases 
with the proportion. Since the ratio of optional tours cannot be extremely large 
in practice, we select a sample point (2, 22%) from r to show the effects of 
tax. When the ratio of optional tours (a) is 2 and tax rate is 10%, the quantity 
discount contract for coordination is w = 6.0625 - 10.27¢, 0.219 ::;; t/J::;; 0.324, 
(Proposition 3). The condition of OLC is 0.298 ::;; t/J ::;; 0.324 (Proposition 4), 
thus, OLC might occur when tax rate is 10%. However, if a is 2 and tax rate 
is 25%, then the contract is w = 6.2105 - 9.1¢, 0.226 ::;; t/J ::;; 0.344. The 
condition of OLC is t/J ~ 0.3528. Obviously, there does not exist any real value 
t/J that makes OLC hold; that is, OLC is curbed with r = 25%. 
In addition, we analyse the effects of tax on equilibrium profits numerically. 
Figure 6 visualizes each player's profit function (n*,:(r), n~:(r)) under two different 
tax rates (r = 17% and 30%). Comparing with the curves in Figure 3 (special 
case with r = 0), we can find that the form of each player's equilibrium profit 
function is not distorted by tax. Yet, the positions of extreme points change 
with the tax rate. It is easy to calculate that aa/()r<O, aa/()r<O, in this instance, 
thus extreme points move left with the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, 
the policymaker can affect the local operator's and the tour operator's decision 
making by changing tax rate. For example, if the local government intends to 
curb the increase in the proportion a (the increase in a might help the growth 
of OLC, see Insight 2), an effective way is to increase the tax rate. Then the 
length of interval (A', A"), in which the two players are motivated to increase 
the proportion, decreases with the tax rate. Thus, the original proportion in 
the contract is more likely to fall in other intervals in which the proportion 
does not change or decrease. 
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Figure 6. Local operator's and tour operator's equilibrium profits with different 
tax rates. 
Extensions 
To ease the technical difficulties we consider a simple tourism supply chain 
model in the previous analysis. The simplified model may not represent reality. 
In order to verify the effectiveness of our model and findings, we provide further 
discussion about the findings as they relate to the following extensions to our 
model: multiple operators in destination and source market, multi-attribute 
utility of the tourists as well as information asymmetry. 
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Multiple operators in both destination and source market 
In practice, there are many operators competing in both the destination and 
the source market. A possible extension of our model is to incorporate more 
players into the tourism supply chain, for example, a model that incorporates 
a tour operator in source market and n(~1) local operators in the destination. 
A two stage game can be used to characterize the price competition (it is similar 
with the model in Guo et a! (2013) which considers one third-party website 
and multi-hotels). In the first stage, the n local operators compete on the 
commission price to achieve proper allocation of tourists from the tour operator 
in the source market. After each local operator's commission is announced, the 
tour operator decides the price of the package tours and the allocation to each 
local operator. By backwards induction we can solve each operator's equilibrium 
decision and profit. For the local operators, since the tourists' attitude in 
optional tours and the ratio of optional tours also affect their equilibrium 
profits, Proposition 1 and 2 may remain valid under some conditions. Moreover, 
the commission competition among the local operators results in even lower 
commission price (local operators will decrease commission price further to 
achieve competitive advantage on the allocation of tourists.), which implies that 
the OLC is more likely to occur in the multiple-local-tour-operator case 
comparing with the original model. Zhang et a! (2009a) point out fierce 
competition among operators to enter into Chinese outbound market. In 
addition, quantity discount contracts may help achieve the coordination of the 
tourism supply chain again, which corresponds to Proposition 3. (For example, 
Dong et a! (20 12) use a quantity discount contract to coordinate the pricing 
competition among three players.) Similarly, in the coordinated scenario, each 
local operator is motivated to lower the commission further, which induces the 
OLC again. As a result, the tax is still an option for curbing OLC and the tax 
rate could be higher comparing with the original model; referring to Proposition 
4, 5 and 6. By following the same idea, we can consider the multiple-tour-
operator case, even the multiple-tour-operator and multiple-local-operator case 
as a future research direction. 
Multi-attribute utility function 
For the sake of tractability, it is assumed that the basic utility from consuming 
package tours is homogeneous for each tourist. However, it is common to see 
that tourists have different utilities for consuming even homogenous products. 
We can incorporate this fact into the utility function, that is, Equation (1) can 
be rewritten as: 
U(17,/1 = 11Qp + a() - P - }'t, 
where QP is the quality of package tours and 11 is tourists' attitude in the 
package tours. 
For convenience, it is also assumed that 11 uniformly distributes in an 
interval. As a result, the demand for package tours is derived from the 
participation constraint U(17,1J ~ 0 on a two-dimension plane. Even with the 
simplified assumption on the distribution of 17, there may be great analytical 
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difficulties to derive the closed form solution. An alternative way is that study 
tour operators' decisions based on some numerical examples. In particular, the 
interesting question is how QP affects local operators' equilibrium profits and 
the connection between the quality of predesigned tours and OLC, which 
remains open for future research. 
Information asymmetry 
A basic assumption in our model is that tourists and operators share symmetric 
information. However, it is also common to see information asymmetry in 
reality. Our future research will extend to the pricing decisions and coordination 
mechanism in the asymmetric information situation. In particular, the local 
operators might benefit from information hiding. In that case, it is necessary 
to analyse the value of information and design a contract to reveal the hiding 
information based on a principal-agent model. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided analysis of a tourism supply chain with optional 
tours. At first, we derived the local operator's and the tour operator's 
equilibrium pricing decisions and profit functions. Based on the analysis of each 
player's equilibrium decision and profit, we provided some insights into how 
to adjust the makeup of optional tours in the equilibrium scenario. Generally 
speaking, the proportion of optional tours depends on tourists' attitudes in 
optional tours in the source market. Specifically, if tourists have positive 
preference for optional tours, the increase in the proportion benefits both of two 
players. If tourists are sufficiently averse to optional tours, then the increase in 
the proportion hurts the two players. 
We also gave coordination analysis to study OLC. Specifically, we employed 
quantity discount contracts under which the commission that the local operator 
charged is discounted according to the quantity of products sold. Further 
analysis of the contracts identifies the conditions under which OLC appears. 
This finding indicates that OLC is economically effective from the perspective 
of coordination. In other words, coordination might be a driver of OLC to some 
extent. In addition, we analysed the relationship between OLC and optional 
tours, which shows that OLC is not likely to occur when the ratio of optional 
tours is relatively small. Thus, a large ratio of optional tours provides 
fundamental conditions for OLC. 
Considering the adverse effects of zero or minus commission in Chinese 
tourism industry, we presented a taxation structure to limit OLC. A tax 
mechanism aimed at optional tours is introduced into the tourism supply chain. 
The tax helps achieve two goals: adjusting tourists' arrivals and curbing OLC. 
Our analysis verified that these two goals can be both reached by establishing 
a proper tax rate. Moreover, each player's profit function is not distorted by the 
tax, but the positions of extreme points change with tax rate. Thus, local 
governments can affect the two players' decision making by changing tax rate. 
The discussion on tax might provide some theoretical support for local 
government intervention in destinations. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
Besides the parameters a1, a2 and a, in the previous sections, we conclude the other 
three related parameters in this sec-tion as follows: 
8 + .W - ~(8 - A.v)2 + 48N-. 
28). 
68). 
28 - ~ ~28 - ).(ce + v)) 
8). 
Proof of Proposition 1 
12~48 + ?u) 
(A1) 
In the cases with 8 > 0, due to v > c,, a1 < a4 < 0. To guarantee that q* > 0, a should 
be greater than zero. Taking the derivative of n;,, with respect to a, we can find that 
an;,,lda>O. Similarly, take the derivative of n;,, with respect to a, we can get an;,/Ja>O. 
Thus, both the local operator's equilibrium profit and the tour operator's equilibrium 
profit increase with a. D 
Proof of Proposition 2 
In the cases with 8 < 0, to guarantee that that q* > 0, a should satisfy 0 < a < a1• 
Solving an;,,Jaa=O we can obtain the three roots a2, a4 and a5. Then we discuss each 
player's profit function in different cases based on the relationships of a2, a!j and a'j. 
The local operator's profit function: 
(a) If 8 ~ - ).(ce+3v)/4, then a., < a2 ~ 0, thus n;,, decreases with a for 0 < a < a1• 
(b) If - ).(c.+ 3v)/4 < 8 < 0, then a5 ~ 0 < a2• Combining with a1 and a4 , the 
relationships of the parameters might follow two cases: (bl) a., ~ 0 < a2 < ap 
(b2) as ~ 0 < al < &2. 
Case (b1) holds if and only if v > max{0,(8+2~)/A.}, and in case (b1) n;,, decreases 
with a in [a2,a1} and increases in (O,a2}. It is not difficult to verify that case (b2) 
cannot hold, thus omitted. 
The tour operator's profit: 
From Equation (Al) we can find that ar, < 0. However, for a,, if 8 ~ - ).(ce + t')l 
2, then a, ~ 0; else if - A<c. + v)/2 < 8 < 0, a, > 0. 
(c) If 8 ~ - ).(c. +v)/2, then n;,, decreases with a in (O,a1). 
(d) If 8 > - ).(c"+v)/2, the relationship of the parameters might follow two cases: 
(d 1) 0 < a, < al and (d2) 0 < al < ay 
Case (d 1) holds if and only if v > max{0,(8+ 2~.)/ ).}, and in case (d 1) n;,, increases 
in (O,a,J and decreases in [a3,a1). However, for case (d2), there are no real parameters 
make it hold, thus omitted: D 
960 TOURISM ECONOMICS 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Substituting Equation (16) into Equations (4) and (5 ), and then combining with 
Equation (12), we can obtain: 
7r
10 
= <{>no, 7r10 = (1 - <{>)no. 
Since each player's profit is aligned with tourism supply chain's profit, the channel 
can be coordinated. Furthermore, to guarantee that each player's profit is Pareto 
improved under the quantity discount contract, parameter <{> should satisfy <{>no ~ n;,, 
and (1 - n)no ~ n:, that is, (1 + aA-)1(2 + aAY ~ <{> ~ 11(2 + aA-). D 
Proof of Corollary 2 
Substituting qoo into Equation (32), we can get: 
</Jce 
2 
</>(1 +aA(l-r))(a8+v) 
2 
a8+v ce 
+ -- + ----- - c, - c,. 
2 2(1 +aA.(l-r)) 
(A2) 
Based on Equations (A2) and (31), we can derive the condition under which w < c1 
holds: 
(a8+v-2(c,+e))(l +aA-(1-r)) + c 
_____________ e_ ~ <{> ~ ----
(l+aA(l-r))((a8+V)(l+aA(l-r))- c.) 2+aA(l-r) 
(A3) 
And if the following inequality holds, there are not any real <{> that makes (A3) hold: 
> 
(a8+v)(l +aA-(1-r)) - c" 
2+aA(l-r) 
(A4) 
Equation (A4) implies the conditions that r should satisfy to curb OLC. D 
